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Financial Structure and Economic Growth 
1. Introduction 
The debate on the relative merits of bank-based versus market-based financial 
systems has a long history of over a century (Gerschenkron, 1962; Allen and Gale, 
2000; Levine 2002). Nonetheless, there is hardly consensus at the theoretical level. 
Competing theoretical models posit the superiority of one type of financial system 
over the other or they simply relegate financial structure as irrelevant. On the one 
hand, Gerschenkron (1962), Diamond (1984), Stiglitz (1985), Boyd and Prescott 
(1986), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Bhide (1993), Stulz (2002), to name but a few, 
argue that the bank-based system is superior to the market-based one. On the other 
hand, Levine (1997), Boyd and Smith (1998), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Jansen 
and Murphy (1990), Boot and Thakor (1997), Wenger and Kaserer, (1998), among 
others, suggest the opposite. Still, Merton and Bodie (1995) and Levine (1997) 
maintain that it is neither the banks nor the markets; instead, it is the provision of 
overall financial services that is crucial in promoting growth. Similarly, Huybens and 
Smith (1999) underline the complementarities between banks and markets in the 
provision of financial services. The theoretical debate on financial structure 
culminates into four distinct views: the bank-based, the market-based, the financial 
services and the law and finance. We briefly discuss them in section 2.    
A large body of empirical literature has attempted to evaluate this debate. 
Early studies focus on UK and the US as market-based systems versus Japan and 
Germany as bank-based systems (e.g. Goldsmith, 1969; Hoshi et al, 1991; Allen and 
Gale, 2000; Mork and Nakkamura, 1999; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Arestis et al., 
2001). They rigorously compare and contrast the country-specific financial structure, 
that is, an assortment of financial markets, instruments and intermediaries in 
operation, and conclude that financial structure is important for economic growth. 
However, Goldsmith (1969), highlighting their shortcomings, argues that these four 
industrialized countries have resembling real per capita income levels and they 
historically share similar growth rates. Consequently, it is hard to attribute their 
analogous growth rates to alternative forms of either the bank-based or the market-
based financial system. Similarly, Beck and Levine (2002) and Levine (2002) assert 
that although UK, US, Germany and Japan did experience periods of divergent 
growth rates, nonetheless, “it is very difficult to draw broad conclusions about bank-
based and market-based financial systems from only four countries” (Beck and 
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Levine, 2002, p. 148). They argue that the empirical assessment of the role of 
financial structure should be based on broad dataset that encompasses wide-ranging 
national experiences. 
Indeed, Beck and Levine (2002), Levine (2002) and an edited volume by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levin (2001), among others, analyze multi-country dataset at 
firm-, industry- and aggregate-levels, employing different econometric methods under 
the panel and/or pure cross-country setup. They are some of the most influential work 
in recent years that directly investigate the role of financial structure in industrial 
expansion, economic growth and the sources of growth. Their broad conclusions are 
that the overall level of financial development (the financial services view) and legal 
system efficiency (the law and finance view) are important; however, financial 
structure (either the bank-based or the market-based view) is irrelevant. The overall 
financial development exerts significant and economically large effect on economic 
growth but there is no cross-country empirical support for financial structure. These 
results are shown to be robust to various sensitivity tests, namely, data, specifications 
and econometric methods. 
These studies are immensely important because they offer broad insights on 
the issue. They are not without concerns however. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) 
concede that the result of economic performance being impervious to financial 
structure does not necessarily imply that institutional structure is of no consequence to 
growth. Instead, it may simply indicate that either there is not one optimal 
institutional structure, which fits everywhere and at all times, or the indicators used in 
the literature may not satisfactorily capture the roles of banks and markets. Likewise, 
Levine and Zervos (1996, p. 325) state that panel regressions mask important cross-
country differences and suffer from 'measurement, statistical, and conceptual’ 
problems. Quah (1993) shows the difficulties associated with the lack of balanced 
growth paths across countries when pooling data (see, also, Caseli et al., 1996). 
Pesaran et al., (2000) point out the issue of parameter heterogeneity across panel units 
(countries) and show that unless this (heterogeneity) is addressed panel estimates 
become biased and inconsistent. Luintel and Khan (2004) show lack of 
correspondence between panel and country-specific estimates, hence, the 
generalizations based on panel results, i.e., the very ‘broad conclusions’, may proffer 
incorrect inferences for several countries, industries or firms of the panel.  
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If the problems of information asymmetries, moral hazards and adverse 
selection were not acute in financial markets and financial institutions were 
operationally efficient (a feasible scenario if financial institutions are of sufficiently 
high quality) then either form of financial system (market-based or the bank-based) 
should, in principal, provide just about the same financial services for augmenting 
growth. Financial structure, in this scenario, would be irrelevant. However, the reality 
is far from it. Countries exhibit different ‘states of the world’, namely; they have 
different production structures, levels of banking, financial and capital market 
development. These structural makeups tend to be rigid requiring significant amount 
of time and efforts for any change. Thus, different ‘states of the world’ may require 
different financial arrangements to cater for the diverse financial needs.  
All the above concerns imply that panel estimates may be misleading at 
country, industry and firm level; consequently, their policy relevance may be limited. 
The neglected parameter heterogeneity across firms, industries and countries may bias 
the estimates. Further, the panel regressions, which do not address the cross-country 
heterogeneity, may dilute the likely effects that emanate from different ‘states of the 
world’. Our aim is to address these issues. We conduct country-by-country time series 
analyses for 14 countries by utilizing the World Bank dataset on financial 
development and financial structure, which is recently updated to 2005 (Beck et al., 
2000). The number of countries is dictated by the availability of sufficiently long-time 
series (see section 5). Our sample consists of low- and middle-income countries with 
varied growth experiences. 
 This paper complements the existing empirical literature by way of new 
results based on rigorous country-by-country time series analyses. We also apply a 
dynamic heterogeneous panel estimator so that we can (i) compare our results with 
the existing empirical literature, and (ii) perform tests of equivalence between the 
time series and panel estimates.  Our approach does not suffer from the ‘measurement 
and conceptual errors’, arising from different definitions and accounting and 
measurement practices across countries; nor does it mask ‘important cross-country 
difference’, issues raised by Levine and Zervos (1996). We also address the issue of 
cross-country parameter heterogeneity by explicitly testing for the poolability of 
cross-country data, a concern raised by Pesaran et al. (2000). The equivalence 
between the panel and the country-specific parameters for our sample countries is also 
examined, a concern raised by Pesaran et al. (op. cit.) and Luintel and Khan (op. cit.).   
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Our basic specification augments the Cobb-Douglas production function by 
measures of financial structure and financial development. The long-run relationship 
between real per capita GDP, per capita physical capital stock, and measures of 
financial development and financial structure is estimated through co-integration tests. 
We apply the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) of Phillips and Hansen (1990) for our 
time series analysis. FMOLS is shown to perform better in small samples. The 
Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Estimator proposed by Pedroni (1999 and 2001) is 
used for panel estimates. To our knowledge, this is the first ever study of this kind, 
which  (i) evaluates the debate both in time series and panel frameworks and tests 
whether the two sets of results (time series versus the panel) are equivalent; (ii) tests 
for the cross-country data poolability; (iii) sheds new light on a number of relevant 
hypotheses regarding the roles of financial development and financial structure when 
countries develop both financially and economically; and (iv) scrutinizes, through 
extensive bootstrap exercise, whether the asymptotic approximations are valid for the 
finite sample estimates and their distributions. We also conduct extensive sensitivity 
tests vis-à-vis data (measures of financial development and financial structure) and 
specifications. 
Our results are quite revealing. First, for the majority of sample countries, 
financial structure appears significant in explaining economic growth. Second, we 
find significant heterogeneity in cross-country parameters and adjustment dynamics; 
tests show that data cannot be pooled for the countries included in our sample, which 
reinforces the use of time series approach. Third, tests also reveal that the panel 
estimates (parameters) do not correspond to country specific estimates. Fourth, our 
bootstrap results provide a new and interesting insight. Asymptotic approximations 
tend to remain valid for the finite sample results so long as the empirical models do 
not utilize impulse dummies and/or interacted regressors. However, when empirical 
models use impulse dummy and/or interacted covariate, the distributions of empirical 
tests statistics do not appear symmetric. This suggests that those empirical studies 
which utilize impulse dummies and/or interacted regressors should base their 
inferences on suitably computed (by way of bootstrap) finite sample critical values. 
Our results are robust to various sensitivity tests. Overall, our findings imply that the 
complete absence of cross-country support for financial structure, reported by panel or 
cross-section studies, may be because they do not sufficiently account for the cross-
country heterogeneity.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the section that follows we 
briefly discuss the theoretical arguments; this is followed by a discussion of the 
existing empirical evidence in section 3. Section 4 outlines our model specifications 
and the econometric methods employed. Section 5 discusses the dataset; section 6 
discusses the results pertaining to cross-country heterogeneity, section 7 presents the 
main empirical results, and section 8 discusses sensitivity tests. Finally section 9 
summarizes and concludes. 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
The relationship between financial structure and economic development can 
be examined on the basis of competing theories of financial structure. These are: the 
bank-based, the market-based, the financial services and the law and finance. We 
discuss them briefly in what follows.  
The bank-based theory emphasizes the positive role of banks in development 
and growth, and, also, stresses the shortcomings of market-based financial systems. It 
argues that banks can finance development more effectively than markets in 
developing economies, and, in the case of state-owned banks, market failures can be 
overcome and allocation of savings can be undertaken strategically. This is 
particularly relevant in the early stages of economic development when the 
institutional background is weak to support market activities (Gerschenkron, 1962). 
Those banks that are unhampered by regulatory restrictions, can exploit economies of 
scale and scope in information gathering and processing; they can also be efficient in 
mobilizing resources and managing risks  (for more details on these aspects of bank-
based systems, see Levine, 2002, and Beck and Levine, 2004). Indeed, bank-based 
financial systems are in a much better position than market-based systems to address 
agency problems and short-termism (Stiglitz, 1985; Singh, 1997). The bank-based 
view also stresses the shortcomings of market-based systems. The latter reveal 
information publicly, thereby reducing incentives for investors to seek and acquire 
information. Information asymmetries are thus accentuated, more so in market-based 
rather than in bank-based financial systems (Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Banks can 
ease distortions emanating from asymmetric information through forming long-run 
relationships with firms, and, through monitoring, contain moral hazard. As a result, 
bank-based arrangements can produce better improvement in resource allocation and 
corporate governance than market-based institutions (Stiglitz, 1985; Bhide, 1993). 
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By contrast, the market-based theory highlights the advantages of well-
functioning markets in promoting successful economic performance, and stresses the 
problems of bank-based financial systems. Big, liquid and well-functioning markets 
foster growth and profit incentives, enhance corporate governance, and facilitate risk 
management, diversification and the customization of risk management devices 
(Levine, 2002, and Beck and Levine, 2004). The inherent inefficiencies of powerful 
banks are also stressed, for they “can stymie innovation by extracting informational 
rents and protecting firms with close bank-firm ties from competition ….. may 
collude with firm managers against other creditors and impede efficient corporate 
governance” (Levine, 2002, p. 3). Market-based financial systems reduce the inherent 
inefficiencies associated with banks and are, thus, better in enhancing economic 
development and growth. A related argument is that developed by Boyd and Smith 
(1998), who demonstrate through a model that allows for financial structure changes 
as countries go through different stages of development, that countries become more 
market-based as development proceeds. An issue of concern, identified by a World 
Bank (2001) study in the case of market-based financial systems in developing 
countries, is that of asymmetric information. It is argued that “the complexity of much 
of modern economic and business activity has greatly increased the variety of ways in 
which insiders can try to conceal firm performance. Although progress in technology, 
accounting, and legal practice has also improved the tools of detection, on balance the 
asymmetry of information between users and providers of funds has not been reduced 
as much in developing countries as it has in advanced economies – and indeed may 
have deteriorated” (p. 7).   
The third theory, the financial-services theory stresses the key financial 
services provided by financial systems (Merton and Bodie, 1995; Levine, 1997). 
Financial services are crucial to new firm creation, industrial expansion and economic 
growth. This theory is actually consistent with both the bank-based and the market-
based views. Although it embraces both, it minimizes their importance in that the 
distinction between bank-based and market-based financial systems matters less than 
was previously thought; it is financial services themselves that are by far more 
important, than the form of their delivery (World Bank, 2001). In the financial-
services view, the issue is not the source of finance. It is rather the creation of an 
environment where financial services are soundly and efficiently provided. The 
emphasis is on the creation of better functioning banks and markets rather than on the 
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type of financial structure. This theory suggests that it is neither banks nor markets 
that matter; it is both banks and markets. They are different components of the 
financial system; they do not compete, and as such ameliorate different costs, 
transaction and information, in the system (Boyd and Smith, 1998; Levine, 1997; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). Under these circumstances, financial 
arrangements emerge to ameliorate market imperfections and to provide financial 
services that are well placed to facilitate savings mobilization and risk management, 
assess potential investment opportunities, exert corporate control, and enhance 
liquidity. Consequently, as Levine (2002) argues, “the financial services view places 
the analytical spotlight on how to create better functioning banks and markets, and 
relegates the bank-based versus market-based debate to the shadows” (p. 401).  
There is, finally, the law and finance theory (La Porta et al, 1998; see, also, 
Levine, 1999). It maintains that the role of the legal system in creating a growth-
promoting financial sector, with legal rights and enforcement mechanisms, facilitates 
both markets and intermediaries. It is, thereby, argued that this is by far a better way 
of studying financial systems rather than concentrating on bank-based or market-
based systems. The World Bank (2001) view on the matter points in a systematic way 
towards “one direction: far from impeding growth, better protection of the property 
rights of outside financiers favors financial market development and investment” (p. 
8). Indeed, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that although countries with poor legal 
systems benefit from a bank-based system, better legal systems improve market-based 
systems, and as such the latter are preferable. This theory also suggests that it is 
financial development, and not financial structure per se, that is critical to firm, 
industry and national economic success.    
3. Existing Empirical Evidence 
As mentioned in the introduction, a number of studies have concentrated on 
comparisons that view Germany and Japan as bank-based systems, while the US and 
UK as market-based systems. These studies employ rigorous country-specific 
measures of financial structure. Studies of Germany and Japan use measures of 
whether banks own shares or whether a company has a ‘main bank’ respectively 
(Hoshi et al., 1991; Mork and Nakkamura, 1999; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). They 
provide evidence that confirms the distinction between bank-based and market-based 
financial systems and their role in economic growth for the countries considered. 
However, reassessment of the role of Japanese financial system in view of the 
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economy’s poor performance in the 1990s has concluded against the beneficial effects 
of bank-based system. Bank dependence can lead to a higher cost of funds for firms, 
since banks extract rent from their corporate customers (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). 
Studies of the US and the UK concentrate on the role of market takeovers as corporate 
control devices (Wenger and Kaserer, 1998; Levine, 1997), and conclude in favor of 
market-based financial systems. Goldsmith (1969), however, argues that such 
comparisons in the case of Germany and the UK for the period 1864-1914 does not 
contribute to the debate since “One cannot well claim that a superiority in the German 
financial structure was responsible for, or even contributed to, a more rapid growth of 
the German economy as a whole compared to the British economy in the half-century 
before World War I, since there was not significant difference in the rate of growth of 
the two economies” (p. 407).  
Levine (2002) reinforces Goldsmith’s (1969) argument by concluding that “it 
is difficult to draw broad conclusions about the long-run growth effects of bank-based 
and market-based financial systems based on only four countries, especially four 
countries that have similar long-run growth rates” (p. 399). He conducts a pure cross-
section study of 48 countries over the period of 1980-95 and finds that the measures 
of financial structure are insignificant in explaining real per capita GDP growth, 
efficient allocation of capital and the individual sources of growth (viz. total factor 
productivity growth, physical capital accumulation and private saving rate); whereas 
indicators of overall financial development significantly explain all these variables.  
Likewise, Beck and Levine (2002), using a panel of 42 countries and 36 
industries, test the hypothesis of whether financial structure helps to grow 
disproportionately those industries that rely heavily on external finance. Their results 
do not support their main hypothesis. Measures of financial structure appear 
ineffectual in explaining industrial growth, new establishment formation and efficient 
capital allocation. Neither does financial structure explain sectoral industrial growth, 
i.e. the growth and the rate of new establishments of labor- and R&D-intensive 
industries. By contrast, measures of overall financial development and legal system 
efficiency significantly explain all these variables.  
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) assemble a new cross-country database and 
compile a number of studies on financial structure and economic growth. This 
database is utilized throughout the book to analyze, among others, the state of 
financial structure across countries and its role in economic growth and the sources of 
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growth while controlling for the overall financial development. The main conclusions 
are: financial systems are more developed in richer countries; higher-income countries 
have more active and efficient stock markets relative to banks; countries with 
common law tradition as opposed to civil law tradition are associated with more 
market-oriented financial systems; countries with civil law tradition tend to be 
associated with underdeveloped financial systems. Cross-country, cross-industry, 
firm- and bank-level data and different econometric methods produce consistent 
results that support the proposition that different financial structure does not help 
explain differences in economic performance (see, also, Beck and Levine, 2002; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). Further, it provides country evidence where 
again the proposition that financial structure does not matter in economic performance 
is supported.1  
Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996), using data for forty-four 
industrial and developing countries for the period 1986 to 1993, conclude that 
countries with well-developed market-based institutions also had well-developed 
bank-based institutions; and countries with weak market-based institutions also had 
weak bank-based institutions; thereby supporting the view that the distinction between 
bank-based and market-based financial systems is of no consequence. Interestingly, 
however, Levine and Zevros (1998), employing cross-country regressions for a 
number of countries covering the period 1976 to 1993, conclude that market-based 
systems provide different services from bank-based systems. In particular, market-
based systems enhance growth through the provision of liquidity, which enables 
investment to be less risky, so that companies can have access to capital through 
liquid equity issues (see, also, Atje and Jovanovic, 1993, and Harris, 1997). More 
recently, Beck and Levine (2004) also report that the development of stock market 
and of banks both have significant and economically large effect on economic growth. 
The World Bank (2001) reaches similar conclusions by stating that “both 
development of banking and of market finance help economic growth: each can 
complement the other” (p. 48).  Arestis et al. (2001), though, provide evidence for the 
superiority of bank-based systems with clear implications for developing economies. 
As stated above, it is conceded that the result of economic performance being 
obdurate to financial structure does not necessarily mean that institutional structure is 
of no consequence to growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). It could also be that 
economic structure determines financial structure. More recently, Allen et al. (2006) 
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find that in fact it is economic structure that determines financial structure. The latter 
develops and prevails in response to the needs of the real economy. Economies 
dominated by physical-asset-intensive firms tend to have a bank-based financial 
system. Countries with knowledge-based industries and intangible-asset-intensive 
firms tend to have a market-determined financial system. In what follows we outline 
our empirical specifications and econometric methods thus setting a framework for 
testing the various propositions we put forward in section 1 above.  
4. Specification and Econometric Methods 
4.1 Specification 
The standard econometric specification of growth models in cross-country 
studies regresses real per capita GDP growth on a number of growth determinants. 
Our approach is time series. Given the non-stationarity of data (see section 7), we 
estimate the co-integrating (long-run) relationship between output, physical capital 
stock, financial development and financial structure. Our basic specification is: 
 
log(Q/L)t = a0 + a1log(K/L)t + a2log(FS)t + a3log(FD)t + e1                 (1) 
where, Q is output, L is labor, K is physical capital stock, FS and FD  respectively are 
measures of financial structure and financial development (both defined  in section 5); 
e1 is the error term. In empirical estimations we use real per capita output (YP) and 
real per capita capital stock (KP), since consistent time series on labor force do not 
exist for most of our sample countries. A high value of FS means a system that is more 
of a market-based variety; while a lower FS means more of a bank-based system.  
Equation (1) is our benchmark empirical model. From the theoretical 
perspective, this can be viewed as a generalized Cobb-Douglas production function 
where financial development and financial structure account for total factor 
productivity. Our specification controls for financial development when modeling the 
effect of financial structure. We are interested in the significance or otherwise of the 
coefficient a2, rather than its sign. In either case a significant a2 implies that financial 
structure matters. A positive and significant a2 signify a market-based financial 
system while a negative and significant a2 supports the bank-based system. The bank-
based view on financial structure predicts a negative and significant a2 (i.e., a2 <0) 
coupled with a positive and significant a3 (i.e., a3 >0); the market-based view, on the 
other hand, predicts both positive and significant a2 and a3 (i.e., a2 >0 and a3>0). The 
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financial services view forecasts an insignificant a2 (i.e., a2 = 0) accompanied by a 
positive and significant a3.  
It is common in cross-section studies to use several other determinants of 
growth - the years of schooling (human capital), black market premiums, indicators of 
civil liberty, revolutions and coups, assassinations, bureaucratic efficiency, 
corruptions etc. However, data on these variables are usually obtained from periodic 
surveys therefore consistent time series are unavailable. Nevertheless, our 
specification (1) compares quite favorably with the ‘simple conditioning set’ specified 
by Levine (2002) and Beck and Levine (2002). They use initial levels of income and 
schooling as their ‘simple conditioning set’ and examine the effect of financial 
structure on economic growth in a panel or cross sectional framework; whereas we 
specify a generalized Cobb-Douglas production function.2 
Theoretical models (e.g., Boyd and Smith, 1998) predict that the bank-based 
system is more conducive to development and growth when countries are at low 
levels of development; however, as income rises the market-based system becomes 
more important. Levine (2002) finds empirical support for this proposition in cross-
section framework. We test this proposition in time series framework through the 
following specifications: 
log(Q/L)t = b0 + b1log(K/L)t + b2log(FD)t +b3 log(FS )+ b4log(FS*YC)t + e2         (2) 
log(Q/L)t = c0 + c1log(K/L)t + c2log(FD)t + c3 log(FS )+ c4log(FS*YUS)t + e3        (3) 
 
where YUS is the US real per capita GDP; YC measures the real income convergence 
of a sample country vis-à-vis the US real income, computed as YUS minus YP. A 
positive and significant b4 supports the predictions of Boyd and Smith (1998). 
However, if b4<0 and significant then evidence goes against their prediction, namely 
that the bank-based system becomes important as low income countries converge to 
the high income levels. We control both for the levels of financial development and 
financial structure while testing for the effect of financial structure when income goes 
up. Beck and Levine (2002) do not include financial structure on its own.3  
Equation (2) is a reasonable specification provided that convergence takes 
place overtime. Indeed, a large body of cross-country empirical literature supports the 
convergence hypothesis. However, in real life, convergence is not a universal 
phenomenon. For example, countries like South Korea and Malaysia have shown 
tremendous degree of convergence vis-à-vis the industrialized countries during the 
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last 30-40 years; whereas countries like Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka have diverged. 
Several examples of this nature could be found. In order to allow for this possibility, 
we directly interact FS with YUS in equation (3). The inspiration and validity for this 
specification comes from Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Beck and Levine (2002). 4 
The interpretation of c4 is similar to that of b4. 
A related hypothesis that emerges from Boyd and Smith’s (1998) analysis is 
the prospective role of financial development when countries develop and achieve 
high level of income. King and Levine (1993) report a larger growth effect of 
financial development on low- and middle-income countries than on developed 
countries. Earlier empirical studies (e.g., Beck and Levine, 2002) examine how the 
impact of financial structure on growth changes when countries become richer and 
more developed but, to our knowledge, no study has examined how financial 
development impacts in the face of rising income levels. We test this hypothesis while 
controlling for financial structure and financial development as follows: 
log(Q/L)t = d0 + d1log(K/L)t + d2log(FS)t + d3log(FD)t + d4log(FD*YC)t  + e4        (4) 
log(Q/L)t = f0  + f1log(K/L)t  + f2log(FS)t  + f3log(FD)t  + f4log(FD*YUS)t + e5         (5) 
 
A positive and significant d4 implies that the impact of financial development 
increases during the income convergence process. Likewise, a positive and significant 
f4 signifies that, despite changes in financial structure, the impact of financial 
development on output levels increases when economies develop and achieve income 
level equivalent to that of US. However, if d4 and f4 appear negative then the 
implication is that the effect of financial development on growth wanes as economies 
develop. This will reinforce the findings of King and Levine (1993) from time series 
perspective. King and Levine (op. cit.) calculate this effect based on the mean level of 
financial development across countries while assuming (implicitly) homogeneity in 
cross-country parameters (this is because they use the parameter obtained from the 
whole panel). Our approach is more flexible for it allows both for the heterogeneity in 
parameters as well as for the levels of financial development across countries.      
As countries develop, their financial sectors develop as well. Supporting 
evidence on this is provided by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) who report that 
financial systems are more developed in richer countries and that their stock markets 
tend to be more active and efficient relative to banks. Moreover, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (1996) report that countries with well-developed market-based institutions 
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also have well-developed bank-based institutions; and countries with weak market-
based institutions also have weak bank-based institutions. Economists have examined 
the role of financial structure as income rises but, to our knowledge, no empirical 
study has assessed the role of financial development and financial structure when 
countries become financially developed and their financial structures alter. Will the 
efficacy of FS and FD on growth and development vary when low- and middle-income 
countries develop financially and converge to the FS and FD of rich countries? 
Equations (6) and (7) test this proposition vis-à-vis the financial structure: 
 
log(Q/L)t = g0 + g1log(K/L)t + g2log(FD)t + g3log(FS)t + g4log(FS*SC)t + e6             (6) 
log(Q/L)t = h0 + h1log(K/L)t + h2log(FD)t + h3log(FS)t + h4log(FS*SUS)t + e7            (7) 
 
where SUS denotes the financial structure of US; SC is a measure of convergence to the 
US financial structure, computed as SUS  minus FS. If the effects of financial structure 
become prominent when low- and middle-income countries develop financially and 
their financial structure converges to that of US then g4 and h4 should appear positive 
and significant. Negative g4 and h4 imply that the effects of financial structure dwindle 
if financial system becomes more market oriented. This follows because the US 
financial system is viewed as more market oriented. 5 An identical proposition vis-à-
vis the financial development is tested as: 
 
log(Q/L)t = j0 + j1log(K/L)t + j2log(FS)t + j3log(FD)t + j4log(FD*FC)t + e8            (8) 
log(Q/L)t = k0 + k1log(K/L)t + k2log(FS)t + k3log(FD)t+k4log(FD*FUS)t + e9         (9) 
 
where, FUS is the financial development of US; FC is a measure of convergence of FD 
to FUS, computed as FUS minus FD. Again, a positive and significant j4 implies that the 
effect of FD on output levels increases in the process of its convergence to FUS and 
vice versa. Likewise, a positive and significant k4 signifies that the effect of FD 
increases when low- and middle-income countries achieve financial development 
equivalent to that of the US; the opposite holds true if k4 is significantly negative. 
Panel studies (e.g., Levine, 2002, Beck and Levine, 2002) evaluate whether (i) 
the legal structure and the rule of law (law and finance view), (ii) the regulatory 
restrictions, (iii) the ownership structure of banks (La Porta et al., 1998), and (iv) the 
accounting standards strengthen the effects of financial structure and financial 
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development on economic growth. Typically measures of ‘rule of law’, ‘shareholders’ 
right’, ‘efficiency of the legal system’, ‘legal origin’, ‘regulatory restrictions’ on 
commercial banking activities, and ‘accounting standards’ are entered as regressors 
by interacting with the measures of financial structure and the overall financial 
development. The general finding is that the measures of legal efficiency and legal 
origin, regulatory restrictions and transparent accounting standards are found to 
strengthen the effect of financial development on growth but their effect via the 
financial structure variable appears insignificant. This strand of analysis sheds 
important light on the preconditions required for the well functioning of financial 
systems. Unfortunately, the lack of sufficiently long time series data on these 
variables precludes us from analyzing them in time series framework. Nonetheless, 
our conjecture is that these pre-conditions are important; they should strengthen our 
results as well.   
4.2 Econometric Methods   
In view of the small sample size and the first order integrated properties of our 
data, we employ the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) of Phillips and Hansen (1990). 
FMOLS provides estimates of the long-run parameters from static level regressions 
when variables are first order integrated, I(1). It corrects for both short- and long-run 
dependence across equation errors hence the corrected t-ratios allow inference 
through the standard distributions. This estimator is super-consistent and it is shown 
to perform well in small samples. The downside is that its distributional assumptions 
rely on asymptotic theory. We rigorously examine the distributional properties of our 
parameters and the test statistics through bootstrap simulations. A brief outline of the 
FMOLS is as follows. Consider a linear static regression: 
'
0 1t t ty x uβ β= + +         (12) 
where yt is a vector of dependent variable and xt is the (kx1) vector of covariates. 
Both yt and xt are assumed I(1). Let Δxt = μ + wt; where μ is a (kx1) vector of drift 
parameters and wt is a (kx1) vector of stationary variables. Define the consistent 
estimates of ut and wt as t t = (u , w )'ξ   . The long-run variance-covariance of ξ (V ) is: 
11 12
21 22
'
v v
V
v v
⎡ ⎤= Γ +Φ +Φ = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
    
 
       (13) 
further define, 
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11 12
21 22
⎡ ⎤Δ ΔΔ = Γ +Φ = ⎢ ⎥Δ Δ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
     
       (14) 
1
21 22 22 21Z v v
−= Δ −Δ             (15) 
where 
2
1
'
1
T
t t
tT
ξ ξ=Γ = − ∑   ; 1 ( , )m ss w s m=Φ = Γ∑  ; 1 1 't ss t t stT ξ ξ−− +=Γ = ∑   ; w(s, m) is the lag 
truncation window. The FMOLS estimator is: 
1 *( ' ) ( ' ) )fmols W W W y TDZβ −= −        (8) 
where 
* 1
12 22t t ty y v v w
−= −   ;  * * ** 1 2( , ,..., ) 'ty y y y=    ; [ ]10 'xk kD I=  and W(txk) is a matrix 
of all covariates including a constant term. The variance-covariance matrix (ψ) is: 
1
11.2( ) ( ' )fmols W Wβ κ −Ψ = ; where 111.2 11 12 22 21v v v vκ −= −    . If the error term obtained 
through FMOLS proves stationary then the regressand and the regressors in equation 
(12) are co-integrated. The stationarity of the error term can be tested through any 
standard unit root test. 
Typically researchers opt for either the blocks bootstrap on the dependent 
variable or the wild bootstrap on the residuals if they suspect that the econometric 
model is mis-specified. When there is no such suspicion about the econometric model, 
the non-parametric i.i.d. (identically and independently distributed) bootstrap, based 
on residuals re-sampling with replacement is used. Our econometric models are 
widely tested and well-established in the literature. Therefore, the issue of 
misspecification does not arise hence we implement the i.i.d. bootstrap. Specifically, 
we assess (i) whether our parameter estimates suffer from small sample bias; and (ii) 
whether the distributions of the parameters and the empirical t-ratios are normal. In 
this way, unbiasedness and normality ensure the validity of our results as well as their 
inferences. We generate 1000 bootstrapped samples of residuals and dependent 
variables in each case. The FMOLS regression is fitted in all these pseudo samples 
and 1000 parameter vector for each specification are obtained.  The mean of these 
estimates, which indicates the extent of biasedness, as well as their distributions are 
derived. We compute the empirical t-ratios and their distribution under the null that 
the parameter in question is zero. Since the theory of bootstrap is well-known, for the 
sake of brevity, we refer the interested readers to Horowitz (2001) for a 
comprehensive discussion of the issues and Hall (1992) for a more technical 
exposition. 
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5. Data Sources, Measurement and Description  
Our sample consists of 14 countries, viz., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece, 
India, Indonesia, Jordan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Portugal, 
Thailand, and Venezuela. Data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross Fixed 
Investment (GFI), GDP deflator and population are obtained from IMF and the 
OECD. Nominal GDP and GFI variables are deflated by the GDP deflator. Data on 
Stock Market Capitalization Ratio (value of listed shares / GDP), Stock Market Total 
Value Traded Ratio (total shares traded on stock market exchange / GDP), Stock 
Market Turnover Ratio (value of total shares traded / average real market 
capitalization) and Private Credit Ratio (Private credit by deposit money banks and 
other institutions / GDP) are directly obtained from the World Bank dataset.6 
Although this dataset covers well over 200 countries and territories, but the reported 
time series are very short for most countries, which precludes their time series 
analyses. There are only 17 countries with at most 27 (1979-2005) to 30 (1976-2005) 
observations (the latter is the longest time series reported in the database). 
Furthermore, these 17 countries are all low- and middle-income countries. For the rest 
of the countries, data span is very short; for few cases data starts from the late 1980s, 
but for most it starts only from the 1990s. Data series on industrialized high-income 
countries are reported from early to mid 1990s only. Of those 17 countries, we drop 
three because of other data problems; hence we analyze 14 countries only.  
Measures of financial structures and financial development are computed 
following Beck and Levine (2002) and Levine (2002). Two measures of financial 
structure employed are: (i) Structure-Activity (SA), which is computed as the log of 
the ratio of Stock Market Total Value Traded to Private Credit, and (ii) Structure-Size 
(SZ), measured as the log of the ratio of Stock Market Capitalization to Private Credit. 
The structure activity measures the activity of stock market relative to banks and other 
financial institutions. This measure is important because stock market activity and 
size are entirely different issues. Stock markets could be sizable because of the large 
number of listings but it may have very little activity because of the lack of active 
trading. The structure size measures the size of stock market relative to the rest of the 
financial sector (bank and non-bank institutions). The aggregate measure of financial 
structure (FS) is the weighted sum of all the principal components of the two variables 
SA and SZ, which captures their total variation.     
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The two underlying measures of financial development are: (i) Finance-Size 
(FZ), computed as the log of the product of Private Credit Ratio and Stock Market 
Capitalization Ratio; and (ii) Finance-Activity (FA), which is the log of the product of 
Private Credit Ratio and Stock Market Value Traded Ratio. Finance-Size measures 
the overall size of stock market, banks and non-bank financial institutions whereas 
Finance-Activity measures their total activities. The aggregate measure of financial 
development (FD) is the weighted sum of all the principal components of FZ and FA. 7 
A consistent time series of total physical capital stock for the whole sample 
period is not available for our sample countries. Therefore, we construct it for each 
country in the sample from the respective real gross fixed investment series using the 
perpetual inventory method. Following Luintel and Khan (1999 and 2004), amongst 
others, a depreciation rate of eight percent and the sample-average growth rate of real 
investment, are used to compute the initial capital stock.     
Table 1 near here 
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of our data set. It is evident that our 
sample consists of countries with varying income levels and growth experiences.  In 
our sample, India has the lowest real per capita income (359 US dollars) and Greece 
has the highest (9549 US dollars) measured in 2000 constant dollars. In terms of 
growth, Korea is the fastest growing economy (5.49% average annual per capita real 
income growth) while Jordan and Venezuela show negative average annual growth 
rates of -0.104%, and -0.62%, respectively, during the sample period. A striking 
feature, however, is that all sample countries have evolved towards a more market-
based financial system over the last thirty years or so. The levels of private credit ratio 
have gone up in all but four (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) sample 
countries. On average, the private credit ratio is 1.65 times higher in the last five years 
compared with the first five years of the sample. However, the rise in capitalisation 
ratios and value-traded ratios are by far greater, however. They have shot up, 
respectively, by 4.23 and 8.76 folds during the same period. Their low base may 
partly explain this huge rise in these relative market sizes and activities. Stock market 
capitalization and stock market value traded both show positive average annual 
growth rates for all countries, although their magnitudes vary across countries. The 
last column of Table 1 shows that the financial systems of all sample countries grew 
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towards a more market-oriented system; the average annual conversion rate is 0.7 % 
for Greece (lowest) and 22.2% for Indonesia (highest).  
6. Heterogeneity 
Our sample consists of low- and middle-income countries, which represent 
different stages of development and economic structures. They also share 
significantly different growth experiences (Table 1). It is, therefore, interesting to 
formally test if it is valid to pool the data set of these countries. This is important not 
least because there is a growing concern about the panel and cross-section tests, in 
that they neglect cross-country heterogeneity. 
Formal tests of the cross-country dynamic heterogeneity are conducted as 
follows. First, we estimate a series of pth (p=1,2,3) order autoregressive and 
distributed lag models, ADL(P), conditioning YP on KP, FS and FD and test for the 
equality of parameters across sample countries. Second, we estimate ADL(P) on 
growth rates and perform the tests of parameter equality.  
Table 2 near here 
Chow-type F tests under the null of parameter equality across sample countries are 
reported in Table 2, where the tests reject the null under all specifications. Thus, the 
elasticity of YP with respect to KP, FS and FD is heterogeneous across countries. 
Furthermore, as another measure of dynamic heterogeneity, we test for error variance 
homoskedasticity across groups. The LM-test of group-wise heteroskedasticity is 
reported in Table 2, which confirms that error variances across sample countries are 
significantly different and this also holds across all specifications. Thus, the elasticity 
of YP with respect to KP, FS and FD as well as the error dynamics across sample 
countries are significantly heterogeneous. Consequently, the data set cannot be 
pooled. This raises concerns with respect to the validity of extant panel and cross-
sectional tests that do not allow for cross-country heterogeneity. 
7. Empirical Results 
7.1 Integration and Co-integration Tests 
We examine the integrated properties of each of the data series, country-by-
country, by two unit root tests: the KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) and the ADF 
(Dickey and Fuller 1979). The former tests the null of stationarity, whereas the latter 
tests the null of unit root. If the KPSS test rejects the null but the ADF test fails to do 
so, then both tests support the same conclusion, i.e. the series in question is a unit root 
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process. 8 Tests show that all the relevant time series: YP, KP, FZ, FA, SZ, SA, FD and 
FS are unit root processes. 9 
Preliminary investigations show that in ten countries of our sample FS and FD 
(the two principal component measures) exhibit very high magnitude of correlation 
raising concern that their joint use in the estimation may contaminate the signs of the 
estimated parameters thereby affecting our inferences regarding the bank-based and 
the market-based financial systems.10 Indeed, our suspicion appeared credible when 
the joint use of FD and FS produced large number significantly positive cases of FS 
with comparatively few cases of FD and some of them with negative signs. The latter 
is theoretically inconsistent. We circumvent this problem by using FZ instead of FD in 
the empirical implementations of all models (1) through (9). However, we discuss the 
results of the joint use of FS and FD as well as a range of other specifications in our 
sensitivity analyses (section 8). FA and FZ are individually less correlated with FS. 
Table 3 near here 
 Table 3 reports results of our benchmark model [Equation (1)] estimated by 
FMOLS utilizing FZ as the measure of financial development. Results in Panel A 
show that YP, KP, FS and FZ are co-integrated; KPSS tests do not reject the null of 
stationary FMOLS residuals for any of the sample countries. The per capita capital 
stock appears positively signed and significant in all but two countries (Argentina and 
the Philippines). We identify that the insignificance of KP for Argentina is due to the 
blips in the data during early 2000. Likewise, for the Philippines it is due to the 
oscillations during the mid-1980s. When these blips are controlled by impulse 
dummies, KP becomes positive and significant for both countries. 11 The financial 
structure variable appears significant in seven countries and so does the financial 
development variable. In five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Mexico and the 
Philippines), both the financial structure and the financial development variables 
appear significant; this is consistent with the findings of Levine and Zervos (1996) 
and Beck and Levine (2004). Surprisingly, financial structure and financial 
development both appear insignificant in five countries (India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Korea and Malaysia). We found some turning points in the underlying data of these 
five countries as well as Thailand and capture them by impulse dummies (see 
footnotes to Table 3) to spot if the results improve. Indeed, the results do improve. 
Now FS and FD both appear significant in further three and four countries, 
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respectively (where they were insignificant before). These results with dummy 
variables are reported separately in Panel B.  
7.2 Bootstrap Tests 
We assess through bootstrap (as discussed in section 3) if our results are 
contaminated by the small size of our sample. We generate 1000 pseudo samples and 
1000 replications of each of our parameter estimates. The mean values of these 
replications are reported in panel C, which appear almost identical to the parameter 
estimates based on our actual sample. This proves that our parameter estimates do not 
suffer from small sample bias. To evaluate their distributions, we plot histograms of 
all the estimated parameters (a0, a1, a2, a3) pertaining to Greece in Panel A of Figure 1. 
These histograms are representative of the parameters of the rest of the sample 
countries because their distributions are alike. Apparently, these histograms are 
symmetric and bell-shaped clearly suggesting that the parameters are normally 
distributed. We report the simulated upper and the lower bounds of empirical t-ratio 
associated with a3 in the last column of Panel C. The histograms of simulated 
empirical t-ratios pertaining to all these four parameters are shown in Panel B of the 
Figure. The simulated upper and lower bounds and the histogram confirm the 
normality of empirical t-ratios as well. 12 
The bootstrap results in Panel C as well as the histograms show that the 
asymptotic approximations work very well for specification (1) in our dataset, 
consequently, results of panel A are valid. However, when impulse dummies are used 
in the estimation, the unbiasedness and normality of parameters remain but the 
distribution of the test statistics (empirical t-ratios) appear asymmetric for most cases 
(see Panel D). Interestingly, the inferences remain qualitatively same even when 
simulated t-ratios are used. 13 Nonetheless, our results indicate that the usage of 
dummy variables, which is common in empirical literature, may have implications on 
the distribution of the test statistics. 
Of the fourteen sample countries, overall, FS appears significant in ten 
countries and FZ in eleven countries. In seven countries FS and FZ both appear 
significant. All significant coefficients of financial development are positively signed; 
this is consistent with the theoretical predictions. Note this was not the case when FS 
and FD were jointly used in the estimation. Of the ten significant coefficients of 
financial structure, nine are positively signed implying that market-based financial 
system appears relatively more important in augmenting domestic output levels 
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(output growth) in the majority of sample countries; the bank-based financial system 
appears relatively more important only for Chile. Even if we ignore the results with 
dummy variables, FS and FD appear statistically significant in seven countries each 
(50% of the total sample of countries). Of these seven countries, the market-based 
system appears important over the bank-based system in six and the opposite holds 
true in only one case. The coefficients of financial development are positively signed 
in all the significant cases. However, it is perfectly normal and valid to use impulse 
dummy variables to capture blips in the data. Moreover, our inferences are based on 
bootstrap simulations which provide added statistical legitimacy to their use. On the 
whole, we find a long-run relationship between output, physical capital stock, 
financial structure and financial development. In the majority of sample countries, 
financial structure as well as the financial development variables appears significant 
in explaining per capita output levels.  
The magnitudes of country-specific point estimates (elasticities) in Table 3 
show a considerable degree of cross-country heterogeneity. The elasticity of capital 
stock exhibits a cross-country divergence of as high as three folds (compare 0.315 for 
Brazil and 0.967 for Jordan). The coefficients of financial development range between 
a minimum of 0.010 (Mexico) to a maximum of 0.109 (Malaysia). Likewise, amongst 
the positive elasticity of financial structure the magnitude ranges between a minimum 
of 0.018 (Mexico) to a maximum of 0.198 (India). Further, Chile shows a negative 
elasticity of financial structure indicating the relative importance of bank-based 
system. 
These financial variables and their associated point elasticities seem to exert 
quite sizeable effects on output growth. For example, Jordan shows an overall 
negative growth of -0.104 percent per annum over the sample period and its mean 
level of Structure-Size (SZ) is 0.985. Assuming that Jordan’s elasticity of Structure-
Aggregate (0.041) applies to SZ, its growth rate would have been easily on the 
positive territory if Jordan had the SZ similar to that of Malaysia. 14 Likewise, 
Venezuela has a mean level of private credit ratio of 0.302. Its elasticity of Finance-
Size [log (Private Credit ratio*Stock Market Capitalization ratio)] is 0.051. Assuming 
that this elasticity is applicable to Private Credit ratio, an average credit flow of 
around 40% would turn Venezuela’s negative growth rate into a positive one. These 
growth effects are economically quite large, however, and one should be cautious 
because they are subject to Lucas Critique and they are also obtained from partial 
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analyses. As Beck and Levine (2002) point out, these results should be viewed as 
economically meaningful relationship rather than as exploitable elasticities.    
7.3 Panel Results and Equivalence Tests 
In Table 4 (Panel A) we report the results obtained from the ‘between-
dimension’ dynamic heterogeneous panel estimator. Pedroni (1999 and 2001) derives 
the computational methods for these panel estimates under FMOLS. In effect, the 
‘between-dimension’ panel estimates are just the mean of the country-specific 
estimates. In the Table, row G contains panel results when no impulse dummy is used 
in the estimation; whereas row H contains results when impulse dummies are used for 
the countries as defined in panel B of Table 3. The panel results show that financial 
structure and financial development both significantly affect output levels and so does 
the capital stock. The positive sign of the coefficient of financial structure variable 
indicates the relative importance of the market-based system. Both sets of panel 
results (reported in rows G and H) are very close and qualitatively similar. Overall, 
these panel results corroborate our time series findings that financial structure is 
significant in explaining output for this set of sample countries. However, these panel 
results conceal the cross-country parameter heterogeneity which has obvious 
implications on the relevance of bank-based versus the market-based financial 
systems. Our panel results are in contrast to the findings of Levine (2002), Beck and 
Levine (2002), and most other panel and/or cross-section based empirical literature 
discussed in sections 1 and 3.  
The panel approach we use differs from those applied by Levin (2002), Beck 
and Levine (2002) and other studies reviewed above. In fact, the cointegration-based 
‘between-dimension’ panel test that we apply may be statistically superior to the panel 
approaches used by the previous studies. This is because the Dynamic Heterogeneous 
Panel Approach addresses the issues of (i) cross-country heterogeneity and (ii) data 
non-stationarity, both of which remain unaddressed in much of the panel/cross-section 
literature discussed above. This difference in empirical methods may reconcile these 
distinctly different sets of results. However, we attach more importance to the country 
specific time-series results, and to the cross-country heterogeneity that they exhibit; 
this is one of the main focuses of this paper. The Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel 
results are important in that they enable us to compare our results with the extant 
literature and further allow us to assess the equivalence between panel and the time 
series estimates. 
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It is extremely important to establish the equivalence between the panel and 
the country-specific estimates of parameters as the latter inform economic policy 
making at the national level. We conduct equivalence tests in three ways. First, we 
impose each panel estimate (parameter) on the corresponding parameter of each 
sample country and test one parameter restriction at a time, through Wald tests, under 
the null that the restriction holds (i.e., panel and country-specific parameters are 
equal). They are country-by-country and parameter-by-parameter tests of restrictions 
which generate a 14x4 matrix of Wald statistics each of which is χ2(1) distributed. We 
call them individual tests. Second, we impose all four panel estimates of a0, a1, a2 and 
a3 on the respective parameter of each sample country and jointly test, country-by-
country, for the equality of country-specific and panel parameters under the null. This 
generates 14 Wald statistics (one for each country) each of which is χ2(4) distributed. 
We call them joint tests. Finally, we compute the parameter equivalence tests 
proposed by Pesaran et al. (2000). This involves summing up all individual χ2 
statistics (computed above) separately for each regressor. This gives us one Wald 
statistic per regressor for the whole panel. Thus, for four regressors (including the 
constant term) we will have four Wald statistics each of which is χ2(N) distributed, 
where N is the number of countries in the panel. Assuming that these tests are 
independent across countries, Pesaran et al. (2000) show that these χ2 statistics tests 
for the null that country-specific coefficients are jointly equal to their respective panel 
estimate.  
Results of equivalence tests are reported in panel B of Table 4. The country-
by-country and variable-by-variable tests of parameter equality show: (i) all sample 
countries exhibit significantly different fixed effects (constant terms), (ii) the country-
specific and panel estimates of the elasticity of capital stock are significantly different 
in all but two countries (Malaysia and Portugal), and (iii) the country-specific and 
panel parameters of financial structure appear significantly different in all but three 
countries (Brazil, Greece and Mexico) and  those of finance size (SZ) variable is 
significantly different in all but one country (Thailand). The joint tests are reported in 
the last column of Panel B whereas the Pesaran et al.’s (2000) tests are reported in the 
last row; both reject the null of equality between country-specific estimates and their 
panel counterparts at a very high level of precision. All in all, we find that panel 
estimates do not represent country-specific parameters. 
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7.4 Further Results  
 Table 5 reports results of specifications (2) through (9) which test various 
hypotheses raised and discussed in section 2. The first two columns of results examine 
whether the financial system becomes more market-based when (i) countries’ income 
level gradually converges towards the US income level; and (ii) countries achieve the 
US real income level, respectively. In the first column, nine countries show 
significant b4 of which six are positive and three negative. This implies that Boyd and 
Smith’s (1998) prediction proves true in six countries while the opposite holds in 
three. For the remaining five countries this effect is insignificant. The picture looks 
pretty similar when the financial structure variable is directly interacted with the US 
real per capita income level. Now, the financial system appears to become more 
market oriented with rising income levels in four countries while it is the other way 
round in three countries. The remaining seven countries show insignificant results. 
Overall, the evidence on Boyd and Smith’s (op. cit.) prediction is rather mixed. There 
is some but not a clear cut support for the proposition that financial structure tends to 
be more market oriented when countries become more developed and get richer. This 
is in contrast to the empirical findings of Beck and Levine (2002). 
 In columns 4 and 5 we report results on the effects of financial development 
(measured by Finance-Size, FZ) on domestic output levels when countries are either 
converging to US income levels or they have fully converged (achieved) the income 
level equivalent to that of the US. Earlier evidence suggests that the effect of overall 
financial development should somewhat diminish when countries get richer and 
become more developed. Of the fourteen countries, five countries show significantly 
positive d4; four countries show significantly negative d4; and for the remaining five 
countries it is insignificant. This scenario does not improve when the FZ variable is 
directly interacted with the US real per capita income. In the majority (eight) of 
sample countries f4 appears insignificant indicating no difference in the effect of FZ 
when countries achieve higher level of income. In four countries f4 is negative and 
significant indicating a diminished effect of FZ on YP. By contrast, in two countries f4 
appears positive and significant indicating the opposite. Again, results are pretty 
mixed. There is no clear direction about the effects of the overall financial 
development on output levels when countries become more developed and get richer. 
Our results suggest that these issues are specific to the country and the economy. 
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In columns 6 and 7, we report results which exhibit the effects of domestic 
financial structure on domestic output levels when countries’ financial structure 
changes either by converging to or by achieving the US financial structure. US 
financial system is regarded as more of the market-based type. Seven countries show 
significant parameters (g4) when their financial structure is interacted with their 
respective convergence measure vis-à-vis the US financial structure. Of these seven, 
four countries exhibit an increased effect of market-based system whereas three show 
the opposite (i.e., a dwindling effect of the market-based system). Half the sample 
(seven countries) shows no significant changes in terms of the financial structure on 
output levels during their convergence to a more market-based system. However, this 
scenario alters when sample countries’ financial structure directly interacts with the 
US financial structure. Now, ten countries become significant with five each having 
positive and negative coefficients. On balance, the evidence is mixed. Of the 
significant countries, one-half shows positive and the other-half shows negative 
output effects when financial structure becomes more akin to that of the US. 
Finally, in the last two columns, we report the results which shed light on how 
the effect of financial development changes when countries become more financially 
developed. When financial development variable is interacted with its convergence 
measure, nine countries show significant coefficient of the interaction term (j4) of 
which five are negative and four are positive. This implies that when countries’ 
financial sector gradually converges to a highly developed one its effect on output 
levels depletes in five countries; increases in four countries; and does not change 
(appears insignificant) in five countries. The results appear paltrier when the sample 
countries’ financial development variable is directly interacted with the US financial 
development measure. Majority of sample countries (nine) appear insignificant; only 
three countries show diminished effects and two countries show the opposite. 
8. Sensitivity Tests 
Two main set of sensitivity tests are conducted.  First, we examine the robustness of 
our results reported in Table 3, obtained from our bench mark model (equation (1)). In 
the empirical implementations of models (1) through (9), Structure-Aggregate (FS) is 
proxied by a weighted principal component measure but we use the Finance-Size (SZ) 
variable instead of the Finance-Aggregate (FD, a weighted principal component) 
variable. This is because FS and FD are highly collinear. In this section we elaborate 
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on this issue in conjunction with other sensitivity tests. The robustness of the results 
of Table 3 is examined by estimating the following relationships by FMOLS: 
 
YP = q0 (C, KP, FS, FD)        (10) 
YP = q1 (C, KP, FS, FA)       (11) 
YP = q2 (C, KP SA, FZ)       (12) 
YP = q3 (C, KP, SZ, FZ)      (13) 
 
where ‘C’ denotes a constant term and other variables are as defined above. In 
equation (10) we replace the Finance-Size (FZ) variable by the Finance-Aggregate 
(FD) to shed light on the issue of collinearity between FS and FD. The results of this 
specification reveal why it makes sense to use FS and FZ rather than FS and FD in our 
data set. In equation (11) we replace Finance-Size (FZ) by Finance-Activity (FA) and 
re-estimate our benchmark model. This will reveal whether our results change when 
the Finance-Size variable is replaced by the Finance-Activity variable. Also note that 
FZ and FA are the constituent components of FD.  In equations (12) and (13) we 
unravel the underlying variables of Structure-Aggregate (FS) and examine the 
significance of Structure-Activity (SA) and Structure-Size (SZ) separately. 
Specifications (10-13) not only reveal the robustness of our results of Table 3 vis-à-
vis various measures of financial development and financial structure they also shed 
light on the effects of size and activities measures.  
The results of specification (10) reveal that FS is significantly positive in 7 
countries; significantly negative in one country and insignificant in the remaining six 
countries. This result is similar to that of the Table 3. However, in this specification, 
FD appears positive and significant in only four countries, negative and significant in 
two and insignificant in eight. The significantly negative coefficients of FD are 
inconsistent with the theoretical predictions. A high degree of collinearity between FS 
and FD may be behind these poor results, which prompted us to use FS and FZ in our 
basic specification. Nonetheless, in this section, we provide a complete picture by 
discussing results based on specifications (11-13) which incorporate, one-by-one, all 
measures of financial structure and financial development outlined in section 5.   
The results from specification (11) appear marginally weaker compared to 
Table 3 because only five countries each show significant effect of Structure-
Aggregate and Finance-Activity on output levels compared to seven countries each in 
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Table 3. However, results from specifications (12) and (13) appear stronger as more 
countries show significant effects. Specification (12) shows significantly positive 
coefficients of Structure-Activity in eight countries coupled with positive and 
significant effects of Finance-Size in nine countries. Likewise, specification (13) 
shows significant Structure-Size in nine countries coupled with significant Finance-
Size in eight countries. The coefficient of KP remains robust in all specifications. All 
sensitivity tests are carried out without any impulse dummy variable as the latter is 
likely to improve the results further. We also examine if results hold when FS and FZ 
are entered individually without controlling for the other. 15 Indeed, Structure-
Aggregate appears significant in seven countries and Finance-Size in nine countries. 
Overall, our basic findings of Table 3 that financial structure matters for the majority 
of sample countries are robust to alternative measures of financial development and 
financial structure. The evidence is there irrespective of the measures and 
specifications used. 
The second set of sensitivity exercise examines the robustness of results 
reported in Table 5. Since Table 5 contains the results of models (2) through (9), we 
illustrate, using model (2) as an example, the alternative specifications utilized for 
their robustness checks. These specifications are: 
 
YP = (C, KP, FA, FS, FS*YC)  (14)  
YP = (C, KP, FZ, SA, SA*YC) (15) 
YP = (C, KP, FZ, SZ, SZ*YC)  (16)  
 
Equation (14) replaces FZ by FA in equation (2). Equations (15) and (16) replace FS 
by its constituent components: SA and SZ. Similar re-specifications are estimated for 
equations (4), (6) and (8). Thus, we run a total of 12 equations. 16 Overall, results of 
table 5 remain qualitatively similar vis-à-vis these sensitivity tests.  
9. Conclusion and Implications 
In this paper we have examined the hotly debated issue of whether financial structure 
matters for economic growth. Much of the recent empirical work analyzes multi-
country dataset at firm-, industry- and aggregate-levels utilizing the panel and/or pure 
cross-section frameworks and concludes that financial structure is irrelevant. We 
summarize these influential studies, among others, in the paper.  
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However, doubts have been raised on these (multi-country) studies because (i) 
they cannot address the cross-country heterogeneity and thus mask important cross-
country differences in the relationship under investigations, (ii) the panel and the 
country-specific parameters (estimates) may not be equivalent hence limiting the 
economic value of panel estimates, and (iii) various countries in the panel are unlikely 
to be on the balanced growth path raising concern on pooled regressions. All these 
concerns are important because of their economic and econometric implications 
which we elucidate in the paper. This paper addresses these concerns. We analyze 14 
low-and-middle income countries using both time series and dynamic heterogeneous 
panel methods. 
We find evidence of significant cross-country heterogeneity in the relationship 
between financial development, financial structure and economic growth. Tests show 
that data of our sample countries cannot be pooled, which reinforces our arguments as 
well as the concerns raised by many. This also underpins our focus on a time series 
analysis. Output level, capital stock, financial structure and financial development 
variables are co-integrated. For majority of sample countries, financial structure and 
financial development appear significant in explaining output levels; this holds under 
time series and panel estimates, both. Tests also reveal that the panel estimates 
(parameters) do not correspond to country specific estimates. This is robustly shown 
by the three tests employed. We assess the validity of our results through extensive 
bootstrap exercise. The asymptotic approximations appeared poor in most 
specifications; therefore, we report bootstrap results. Our bootstrap results reveal an 
interesting insight. They show that the asymptotic approximations remain valid for the 
finite sample results (parameters and test statistics) so long as the empirical models do 
not utilize impulse dummies and/or interacted regressors. However, when empirical 
models employ impulse dummy and/or interacted covariate, the distributions of the 
tests statistics (empirical t-ratios) tend to be asymmetric. The latter suggests that those 
empirical studies which utilize impulse dummies and/or interacted regressors should 
base their inferences on suitably computed (by way of bootstrap) finite sample critical 
values.  
We also examine how the effects of financial development and financial 
structure change when (i) countries become economically more developed and get 
richer, (ii) countries’ financial structure develops and converges to that of the US and 
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(iii) countries’ level of overall financial development converges to that of the US. 
Unlike Beck and Levine (2002), we find only limited empirical support for Boyd and 
Smith’s (1998) theoretical prediction that the importance of market-based financial 
system rises with the rise in income. We also found very limited support for the 
earlier assertion that the effect of financial development on growth tapers off as 
countries become economically more developed (King and Levine, 1993).  Our tests 
of various hypotheses regarding the prospective role of financial development and 
financial structure when countries develop both economically and financially reveal 
mixed results which reinforces our arguments of a heterogeneous relationship cross 
countries. Our results are robust to various sensitivity tests. Overall, our findings 
imply that financial structure and financial development matter for output levels and 
economic growth. Our findings do not invalidate the findings of Beck and Levine 
(2002) and Levine (2002), instead we attribute this difference to our empirical 
approach, which allows for cross-country heterogeneity in parameters and adjustment 
dynamics. Our findings are more in line with Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck and 
Levine (2004). The complete absence of cross-country support for financial structure, 
reported by panel or cross-section studies, may be because they do not sufficiently 
account for cross-country heterogeneity. The main policy message coming out of our 
analyses is that financial structure matters for economic growth. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (1978-2005) 
 YP YG PCS PCE PCM PCG SMS SME SMM SMG SAS SAE SAM SAG SZS SZE SZM SZG 
ARG 7117 0.251 0.289 0.146 0.203 -3.190 0.033 0.651 0.184 0.141 0.038 0.304 0.166 0.131 0.115 4.257 1.089 0.179 
BRA 3156 1.033 0.484 0.345 0.438 -1.587 0.042 0.411 0.190 0.087 0.033 0.392 0.251 0.105 0.087 1.191 0.523 0.104 
CHL 3665 3.299 0.335 0.707 0.533 5.663 0.242 0.960 0.592 0.077 0.040 0.129 0.096 0.048 1.071 1.356 1.071 0.020 
GRE 9549 1.548 0.347 0.663 0.409 4.418 0.099 0.624 0.283 0.051 0.010 0.364 0.349 0.104 0.322 0.967 0.632 0.007 
IND 359 3.177 0.201 0.310 0.243 2.161 0.027 0.367 0.190 0.102 0.098 1.274 0.730 0.121 0.134 1.169 0.749 0.079 
IDN 651 3.323 0.052 0.192 0.253 9.703 0.000 0.194 0.114 0.341 0.001 2.153 0.455 0.286 0.007 0.998 0.383 0.222 
JOR 1844 -0.104 0.476 0.708 0.645 2.056 0.464 0.985 0.637 0.053 0.096 0.429 0.184 0.120 0.985 1.399 0.985 0.031 
KOR 7501 5.487 0.486 1.285 0.935 4.626 0.076 0.496 0.294 0.065 0.100 0.934 0.474 0.056 0.292 0.387 0.292 0.018 
MYS 2766 4.841 0.445 1.301 0.952 4.720 0.396 1.429 1.190 0.075 0.173 0.323 0.458 0.033 1.205 1.105 1.205 0.026 
MEX 5132 1.196 0.173 0.166 0.175 -0.982 0.052 0.201 0.167 0.080 0.094 0.335 0.341 0.128 0.312 1.215 0.852 0.091 
PHL 955 0.573 0.355 0.393 0.335 0.478 0.087 0.503 0.306 0.060 0.058 0.228 0.223 0.019 0.885 1.273 0.885 0.055 
PRT 8344 2.345 0.755 1.454 0.852 2.499 0.004 0.400 0.187 0.210 0.000 0.137 0.098 0.387 0.005 0.276 0.203 0.180 
THA 1509 4.532 0.381 0.980 0.830 3.796 0.042 0.531 0.314 0.120 0.123 0.565 0.273 0.051 0.109 0.545 0.322 0.079 
VEN 5098 -0.619 0.510 0.096 0.302 -5.776 0.043 0.051 0.067 0.013 0.002 0.032 0.071 0.101 0.085 0.530 0.412 0.075 
YP = GDP per capita in (2000) US Dollars. YG = average annual growth rate of GDP per capita. PC = Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions to GDP ratio. SM = Stock Market Capitalisation to GDP ratio. SA = Stock Market Total Value Traded to Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks & Other 
Financial Institution. SZ = Stock Market Capitalization to Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks & Other Financial Institution. Subscripts S, E, M and G are the average 
value of the first five years, the average value of the last five years, the mean value of the sample period and the average annual growth rate, respectively. The country 
mnemonics in this and subsequent tables are: ARG= Argentina; BRA=Brazil; CHL=Chile; GRE=Greece; IND=India; IDN=Indonesia; JOR=Jordan; KOR=Korea; MYS= 
Malaysia; MEX= Mexico; PHL= the Philippines; PRT = Portugal; THA= Thailand; VEN = Venezuela. 
 
  
 
35
Table 2: Tests of heterogeneity of financial structure and growth dynamics across 
sample countries 
 Specification: A Specification: B 
 P=1 P=2 P=3 P=1 P=2 P=3 
 Parameter equality  
        
38.926a 
(5, 316) 
23.909a 
(9, 246) 
20.371a 
(13, 176) 
39.170a 
(9, 232) 
14.637a 
(7, 147) 
13.128a 
(13, 162) 
LM Test 260.708a 
    
128.037a 138.228a 91.923a 129.987a 166.77a 
 
The specification A: 0 1 2 3 3 1
1 1 1 1
L L L L
P P P S D
i t i i t i i t i i t i t
i i i i
Y Y K F Fλ λ λ λ λ ε− − − −= = = == + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
The specification B: 0 1 2 3 1 3 2
1 1 1 1
L L L L
P P P S D
i t i i t i i t i t i t
i i i i
Y Y K F Fθ θ θ θ θ ε− − − −= = = =Δ = + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
Equality of θ and λ are standard (Chow type) F-tests of parameter equality across the sample 
(fourteen) countries. Numbers within parentheses, (.), are the degrees of freedom of F 
distribution. Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests (see text) reject the null of homoskedastic error 
variances across the sample countries; they are χ2(13) distributed. Superscript ‘a’ indicates 
rejection of the null at 1%; and this applies across all tests. Variable definitions are: YP = log 
of per capita real GDP; KP = log of per capita real physical capital stock; FS is Structure-
Aggregate; and FD = Finance-Aggregate. Results remain qualitatively same when FD is 
replaced by FZ (Finance-Size). 
 
  
 
36
Table 3: Results of Fully Modified OLS 
 log(YP)t = a0 + a1log(KP)t + a2log(FS)t + a3log(FZ)t + e1 
 Panel A: Asymptotic Results Panel C: Bootstrap Results 
 a0 a1 a2 a3 ημ# a0 a1 a2 a3 a3 (UB / LB) * 
ARG 9.416 (0.000) 0.004 (0.980) 0.035 (0.029) 0.041 (0.000) 0.130 9.449 0.001 0.034 0.041 3.011 / -3.260 
BRA 5.907 (0.000) 0.315 (0.000) 0.027 (0.000) 0.025 (0.034) 0.110 5.872 0.319 0.026 0.026 3.641 / -3.385 
CHL 2.046 (0.000) 0.734 (0.000) -0.034 (0.000) -0.007 (0.698) 0.062 2.006 0.738 -0.034 -0.009 3.842 / -3.853 
GRE 2.357 (0.026) 0.710 (0.000) 0.020 (0.001) 0.061 (0.000) 0.175 2.347 0.711 0.020 0.062 3.419 / -3.639 
IND 2.019 (0.000) 0.693 (0.000) 0.022 (0.174) 0.007 (0.624) 0.252 1.996 0.696 0.022 0.007 3.718 / -3.753 
IDN 3.375 (0.000) 0.557 (0.000) 0.009 (0.562) 0.015 (0.159) 0.082 3.386 0.556 0.009 0.015 3.358 / -3.226 
JOR -0.573 (0.778) 0.967 (0.000) 0.023 (0.153) -0.009 (0.905) 0.200 -0.594 0.970 0.022 -0.007 3.498 / -3.120 
KOR 2.180 (0.000) 0.710 (0.000) -0.023 (0.213) 0.041 (0.196) 0.159 2.176 0.711 -0.024 0.040 3.493 / -3.534 
MYS 3.496 (0.003) 0.575 (0.000) -0.023 (0.570) 0.054 (0.416) 0.169 3.512 0.572 -0.023 0.055 3.785 / -3.881 
MEX 2.588 (0.000) 0.672 (0.000) 0.018 (0.011) 0.010 (0.032) 0.213 2.577 0.673 0.019 0.010 3.748 / -3.426 
PHL 7.723 (0.000) 0.074 (0.481) 0.054 (0.000) 0.066 (0.000) 0.121 7.747 0.072 0.054 0.066 3.652 / -3.727 
PRT 4.324 (0.001) 0.515 (0.000) -0.006 (0.635) 0.051 (0.002) 0.113 4.289 0.518 -0.006 0.051 3.377 / -3.298 
THA 2.992 (0.000) 0.599 (0.000) 0.033 (0.000) 0.025 (0.158) 0.059 2.996 0.598 0.033 0.025 3.167 / -3.462 
VEN 5.824 (0.000) 0.338 (0.041) -0.007 (0.575) 0.051 (0.007) 0.179 5.867 0.334 -0.008 0.051 3.831 / -3.540 
Panel B : Asymptotic Results (with dummies) Panel D: Bootstrap Results (with dummies) 
IND 2.275 (0.000) 0.661 (0.000) 0.026 (0.061) 0.008 (0.496) 0.317 2.281 0.661 0.026 0.009 3.825 / -4.167 
IDN 4.511 (0.000) 0.436 (0.000) 0.198 (0.000) 0.020 (0.000) 0.306 4.502 0.437 0.198 0.020 4.148 / -4.205 
JOR -1.463 (0.371) 1.059 (0.000) 0.041 (0.001) -0.041 (0.475) 0.276 -1.379 1.050 0.040 -0.042 11.040 / 2.550 
KOR 2.576 (0.000) 0.674 (0.000) -0.023 (0.148) 0.059 (0.027) 0.107 2.569 0.675 -0.023 0.059 1.676 / -6.222 
MYS 4.224 (0.000) 0.508 (0.000) -0.062 (0.115) 0.109 (0.079) 0.188 4.274 0.503 -0.065 0.113 1.204 / -7.296 
THA 3.083 (0.000) 0.591 (0.000) 0.034 (0.000) 0.032 (0.000) 0.062 3.084 0.591 0.034 0.032 3.922 / -4.087 
The details of impulse dummies are: IND (83=1 & 03=04=1); IDN (2001=1 & 1998=1999=2000=1); JOR: (01=02=03=1); KOR: (89=90=1 & 99=00=1); 
MYS (83=1 & 98=99=00=1); THA (93=1 & 98=99=1). For example, for India (IND) there are two impulse dummies: one with 1983=1 and rest zero and 
the other where 2003 and 2004 take the value of unity and rest zero. Similar interpretation applies for the dummies of other countries. * UB and LB Denote 
the upper and the lower bounds of empirical t-ratios obtained from i.i.d. bootstrap with 1000 replications. # KPSS test under the null that the FMOLS 
residuals are level stationary. The critical values for ημ are 0.739, 0.463 and 0.347 at 1%, 5% and 10%. Tests cannot reject the stationarity of FMOLS 
residuals in any case.   
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Table 4: Panel Results and Tests of Parameter Equivalence 
 Panel A: FMOLS based Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Results 
 C KP FS FZ  
G 3.834(0.000) 0.533(0.001) 0.011(0.000) 0.031(0.000)  
H 3.956(0.000) 0.521(0.000) 0.023(0.000) 0.035(0.000)  
 Panel B: Tests of Parameter Equivalence 
 Country-by-country & parameter-by-parameter tests  Joint tests 
 C KP FS FZ Joint 
ARG 221580 (0.000) 1799 (0.000) 33.2(0.000) 2.8 (0.093) 223870 (0.000)
BRA 173440 (0.000) 1932 (0.000) 0.7 (0.414) 4.3 (0.038) 175380 (0.000)
CHL 298950 (0.000) 3707 (0.000) 262.4 (0.000) 142.4(0.000) 303060 (0.000)
GRE 100930 (0.000) 1410 (0.000) 0.4 (0.535) 27.6 (0.000) 102370 (0.000)
IND 97382 (0.000) 646 (0.000) 3.4 (0.066) 39.0 (0.000) 98349 (0.000)
IDN 28042 (0.000) 663 (0.000) 2795.8 (0.000) 20.4 (0.000) 94424 (0.000)
JOR 261770 (0.000) 2578 (0.000) 2.7 (0.098) 51.5 (0.000) 264520 (0.000)
KOR 71041 (0.000) 877 (0.000) 78.4 (0.000) 22.3 (0.000) 72159 (0.000)
MYS 201 (0.000) 0.440 (0.507) 20.1 (0.000) 15.5 (0.000) 292 (0.000)
MEX 147180 (0.000) 1786 (0.000) 1.8 (0.179) 47.2 (0.000) 149010 (0.000)
PHL 302940 (0.000) 4568 (0.000) 47.5 (0.000) 8.7 (0.003) 308220 (0.000)
PRT 2293 (0.000) 1 (0.407) 14.1 (0.000) 4.4 (0.036) 2312 (0.000)
THA 74949 (0.000) 484 (0.000) 12.2 (0.000) 1.0 (0.314) 77905 (0.000)
VEN 37689 (0.000) 362 (0.000) 9.8 (0.002) 2.9 (0.088) 38064 (0.000)
Pesaran  
et al. 1818387(0.000)  20812(0.000) 3283(0.000) 390(0.000)  
Results of Panel B are based on the model reported in row H in Panel A. The country-by-
country and parameter-by-parameter tests are 2 (1)χ  distributed; the joint tests are 
2 (4)χ distributed; and Pesaran et al.’s tests are 2 (14)χ distributed.  The p-values are 
reported within parenthesis. 
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Table 5: Results of Fully Modified OLS (Bootstrap Results) 
 FS*YC 
[2] 
FS*YUS 
[3] 
FZ*YC 
[4] 
FZ*YUS 
[5] 
FS*SC 
[6] 
FS*SUS 
[7] 
FZ*FC 
[8] 
FZ*FUS 
[9] 
 b4 c4 d4 f4 g4 h4 j4 k4 
ARG 0.203 (0.084) 0.315 (0.216) -0.007 (0.098) -0.041 (0.006) 0.026 (0.000) 0.065 (0.298) -0.006 (0.028) -0.009 (0.004) 
BRA -0.019 (0.386) -0.032 (0.230) -0.022 (0.018) -0.079 (0.000) 0.004 (0.046) 0.001 (0.082) -0.006 (0.034) 0.006 (0.422) 
CHL 0.119 (0.000) 0.091 (0.002) -0.036 (0.032) -0.083 (0.194) 0.006 (0.000) 0.010 (0.252) 0.018 (0.000) -0.014 (0.644) 
GRE 0.041 (0.110) 0.048 (0.328) 0.003 (0.002) 0.005 (0.024) 0.004 (0.210) 0.009 (0.000) -0.015 (0.000) 0.002 (0.000) 
IND 0.240 (0.000)1 0.224 (0.000) 0.082 (0.018) 0.083 (0.020) 0.016 (0.454) 0.002 (0.592) -0.007 (0.000) 0.012 (0.160) 
IDN -0.789 (0.000)1 -0.792 (0.000)1 0.028 (0.984) 0.023 (0.904) -0.074 (0.000)1 -0.095 (0.000) 0.001 (0.002)1 0.008 (0.012)1 
JOR 0.121 (0.000)1 0.140 (0.002)1 0.297 (0.000)1 0.087 (0.632) -0.012 (0.556) 0.016 (0.022)1 -0.134 (0.000) -0.057 (0.384) 
KOR -0.268 (0.016) -0.211 (0.034) 0.124 (0.142) -0.048 (0.974) 0.002 (0.376) -0.015 (0.008) 0.064 (0.000) 0.015 (0.468) 
MYS 1.129 (0.006) -0.058 (0.820) 0.045 (0.840) -0.129 (0.704) 0.017 (0.492) 0.005 (0.484) 0.010 (0.260) -0.023 (0.412) 
MEX -0.160 (0.000) -0.179 (0.000) 0.022 (0.966) 0.021 (0.784) -0.015 (0.000) -0.022 (0.000) -0.003 (0.148) -0.003 (0.310) 
PHL -0.034 (0.372) -0.023 (0.624) 0.006 (0.000) -0.009 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000) 0.020 (0.874) -0.002 (0.000) 
PRT 0.044 (0.470) -0.004 (0.970) 0.032 (0.034) -0.007 (0.634) 0.000 (0.722) -0.002 (0.000) -0.001 (0.674) -0.007 (0.062) 
THA 0.181 (0.000) 0.143 (0.004) -0.042 (0.000) -0.040 (0.000) 0.024 (0.002) 0.013 (0.106)1 0.002 (0.000) -0.004 (0.224) 
VEN -0.206 (0.142) -0.221 (0.250) 0.066 (0.246) 0.022 (0.472) 0.000 (0.958) -0.032 (0.004) 0.002 (0.456) 0.003 (0.282) 
1. Impulse dummies, as defined in Table 3, are used only for these countries. Their parameters appeared insignificant without impulse dummies. No 
dummy is used for rest of the countries. Number within brackets, [.], indicates the relevant model (equation) in the text.  
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Figure 1 
 
Panel A: Parameter Distributions 
 
 
 
Panel B: T-statistic Distribution 
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1
 Utilizing panel data for 76 emerging and developed countries, covering the period 1990-
2003, Yartley (2006) concludes that financial structure does not affect cross-country diffusion 
of information communication technology (ICT).  
  
2
 Barro and Lee (2000) and Cohen and Soto (2007) provide periodic data, five yearly and 10 
yearly respectively, on educational attainment for several countries of the world. We thought 
of interpolating annual series on educational attainments for our sample countries from these 
periodic observations. However, the owners of the respective data sets advised us strongly 
against interpolation, on the grounds of unreliability. We, therefore, decided not to pursue this 
matter any further. 
 
3
 Beck and Levin (2002) use a panel framework whereas ours is a time series approach. Our 
specification directly shows the effect of FS when income increases but this is not the case 
with the specification of Beck and Levine (op. cit.).    
 
4
 Rajan and Zingales (1998) use US firms’ dependence on external funds as proxy of 
dependence on external funds of other 41 countries’ firms they analyse. Beck and Levine 
(2002) follow the same approach. Likewise, in our specifications, we treat convergence to US 
levels of income per capita, financial development and financial structure as indicator to a 
higher level of economic and financial development and/or sophistication.     
 
5
 Note that the negatively signed j4 and k4 should not be interpreted as indicating to a bank-
based system because interactions with FC and FUS imply convergence of financial system to a 
more market-based variety, i.e., of US type.  
 
6
 This is a New Database on Financial Development and Structure (see Beck et. al., 
2000); we have used the latest revised version as at September 14, 2006. 
 
7
 Beck and Levine (2002) and Levine (2002) utilize only the first principal component of the 
underlying data as their overall measures of financial development and financial structure. We 
utilize the weighted sum of all the principal components so that we capture the total variation 
in the underlying measures of financial development (FD) and financial structure (FS). The 
proportions explained by the first principal component of FS ranges from a minimum of 62% 
(Argentina) to a maximum of 94% (Greece) across the sample countries. For FD, it ranges 
between a minimum of 81% (Venezuela) to a maximum of 99% (Portugal). In all cases we 
have two eigenvectors and the proportion explained by each vector is used as weights. 
  
 
41
                                                                                                                                            
8
 Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) show that KPSS tests are more powerful than the usual DF/ADF 
tests. However, Caner and Kilian (2001) warn against these power gains, especially for high 
frequency data. Our data are low frequency.  
 
9
 These unit root tests are pretty standard so we do not report them to conserve space but they 
are available on request.  
 
10
 The correlation coefficient in some cases is as high as 0.9.   
 
11
 Argentina requires an impulse dummy of unity for the years 2000 to 2003 and zero 
otherwise. The dummy for the Philippines requires unity over 1983 to 1985 and zero 
otherwise. 
 
12
 These empirical t-ratios are computed under the null that the parameter in question is zero. 
The distributions of the empirical t-ratios associated with other countries and parameters are 
very close to the one reported here. 
 
 
13
 In other words, despite the asymmetry found in the distribution of empirical t-ratios in 
panel D, the inference remains qualitatively same even when bootstrap t-ratios (or p-values) 
are used. It should be noted that this invariance in inference between asymptotic and bootstrap 
results hold for Equation (1) only. For the rest of the specifications, (equations (2) to (9)), 
invariance in inferences does not hold therefore we report bootstrap results.   
 
14
  This is calculated as: [(1.205/0.985)-1]*0.041*100. This gives Jordan an additional mean 
growth rate of 0.916% which is more than enough to supersede her negative growth rate of -
0.104%. 
15
 This essentially involves estimating the following models: YP = f (C, KP, FS) and YP = g(C, 
KP, FZ) by FMOLS. 
 
16
 These re-specifications pertain to the models reported in columns: 2, 4, 6, and 8 in table 5. 
We unravel the constituent parts of FS and FD which gives us 12 models. 
